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Abstract
We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information
about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’
joint reaction to unobserved common shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered
entry of lenders into an information sharing platform. Upon joining the platform,
lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others are offering. This effect is
mediated by market structure: lenders with higher market share or operating in con-
centrated markets react less to competitors’ information. Contract terms and outcomes
are thus shaped by the availability of competitor information and not just by borrower
or lender fundamentals.
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Introduction
Information shapes markets and strategic behavior. Indeed, in many settings, information
is dispersed: market participants do not have full information about their counterparties or
their competitors’ actions. Strategic and information considerations are thus linked: agents’
optimal actions depend on their information about competitors’ actions. Recent advances in
information technology have attracted considerable attention from academics and policymak-
ers concerned with the effects on competition.1 In the context of credit markets, information
technology has been studied primarily through the lens of learning about borrowers through
the revelation of their credit records or the collection of soft information. However, there is
also an increased scope for learning about competitors, which introduces new issues related
to competition, information aggregation, and the distribution of loan terms.
Conceptually, the implications of lenders learning about their competitors are largely
unresolved. As Vives (2006) notes, "the analysis of information sharing is complex [and]
depends on the type of competition, uncertainty as well as on the number of firms." Existing
theoretical models imply a wealth of empirical predictions, with considerable disagreement
over channels, magnitudes, and even the sign of these effects. The industrial organization
literature emphasizes the role of imperfect competition, suggesting that lenders can either
mimic rivals, if there are strategic complementarities, or differentiate themselves through
product choice. There is also a role for information aggregation, in which rivals’ actions
partially reveal their private information. Moreover, recent work has shown that the link
between information and market outcomes is more complex than previously thought (Murfin
and Pratt, 2017a; Liberman et al., 2018; Goldstein and Yang, 2019).
The main contribution of this paper is to address the paucity of empirical research on
this issue. The goal is not to distinguish among all existing models but to make progress by
providing several credible empirical facts. Questions related to information and imperfect
competition are notoriously difficult to study empirically. Indeed, the empirical challenge
in estimating the effect of learning about competitors is how to isolate variation in agents’
information sets. Specifically, lenders might offer similar terms not because they respond to
each other but simply because they respond to the same economic shock.
Our paper addresses this challenge by exploiting a unique setting that permits us to
observe a direct shift in information that lenders have about rivals. Specifically, we use
micro lending data around the introduction of a commercial credit information sharing plat-
form, PayNet, covering small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the United States. PayNet
1 In the words of European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager, "the future of big data is
not just about technology. It’s about things like. . . competition." EDPS-BEUC Conference on Big Data
and Competition, Brussels, September 29, 2016.
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launched in 2001; since then it has attracted eight of the 10 largest lenders in the market,
a group that includes Bank of America, Wells Fargo, PNC, John Deere, IBM, Volvo, and
Caterpillar. The platform provides information on contract terms offered by other lenders
that was previously not widely available. We exploit the staggered entry of lenders to the
platform to estimate the response to competitors and find that lenders adjust their terms
toward what others are offering. Moreover, this effect is strongly mediated by the distribu-
tion of market shares: the effect is driven by markets with lower levels of concentration and
lenders with low market shares. We provide additional evidence that this result cannot be
explained by more conventional channels of information sharing, nor by lenders’ joining at
the same time as shocks unrelated to the platform. Finally, we investigate one important
consequence of our findings: matching competitors tends to increase delinquencies during
the recent crisis, possibly because of the neglect of future risk.
We document this evidence in the context of maturity dynamics for SMEs’ equipment
financing contracts from 2001 to 2014. With over $1 trillion of annual volume, equipment
financing is a major component of corporate investment, particularly for SMEs. Because
of their implications for firms’ liquidity and investments, maturity cycles and rollover risk
became a concern during the recent crisis and recovery. The Survey of Terms of Business
Lending shows that maturity on loans lasting over a year fell by 30% between 2007 and
2010, and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018) document the dramatic effect of rollover risk on
firm investment. Moreover, in our context of financing a specific piece of equipment, it is
natural to focus on maturity, as it is negotiable, while contract size is largely dictated by the
equipment needed. And by design, interest rates are not shared in the platform, just as they
are typically not shared in consumer credit bureaus. Finally, there is evidence consistent
with oligopolistic competition in this market (Murfin and Pratt, 2017b).
Our empirical strategy addresses key empirical challenges associated with estimating the
effect of learning about competitors. Specifically, two lenders can offer similar contracts not
because they react to what the other is offering but simply because they react to the same
shock to fundamentals. This is a crucial issue because it is plausible that at least some
of these fundamentals cannot be observed by the econometrician and therefore cannot be
controlled for. To address this challenge, we rely on two features of our setting. First, we
exploit lenders joining the platform in a staggered fashion to generate variation in information
sets within and across lenders over time. Second, for each borrower-lender relationship, we
observe contracts made before and after the lender joins the platform.2 Our empirical tests
2 Joining involves an invasive implementation process in which PayNet establishes access to the lenders’ IT
systems to ensure complete and truthful sharing. PayNet uses shared information to create credit scores
and reports for members. Nonmembers cannot access the system or its scores and reports.
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do not take a stand on the direction of the response. The key idea is that, while a lender’s
terms may track the bureau average before joining, whether they track it relatively better or
worse afterward reveals the sign of the response.
However, this strategy potentially exposes us to two important confounders. First,
lenders can respond to information on the platform other than rivals’ terms—specifically
borrower credit records. There is evidence that this reduction in asymmetric information
leads lenders to start lending to borrowers with different characteristics (Liberti et al., 2016,
2018; Foley et al., 2018). To abstract from any change in borrower composition, our tests
are conducted within an existing relationship.3 We look within the same borrower-lender
pair over a short window around the lender’s joining the platform and compare the change
in maturity to the change for similar borrowers. Second, the decision to join the platform is
voluntary and can therefore depend on factors that could affect maturity, independent of the
information revealed by the platform. We leverage our micro-data to show that borrower or
lender shocks coinciding with the timing of joining cannot explain our results. Specifically,
we conduct within borrower-time tests (Khwaja and Mian, 2008) and show that lenders react
to the information driven by others joining the platform, which is beyond their control.
In our main specification, we measure average maturity within collateral type-quarter for
members and control for contract size, credit history, and contract type as well as borrower-
lender relationship and collateral type-year fixed effects. We establish two stylized facts.
First, we show that the gap between the maturity offered by a lender and what others in the
platform are offering shrinks by 7% after the lender joins. Lenders’ terms therefore track the
bureau average relatively better after joining, consistent with a partial matching of rivals.
Economically, this average effect corresponds to a 10% probability of a six-month change in
maturity, therefore substantially affecting rollover risk. Interestingly, the effect is symmetric:
sometimes lenders match rivals by increasing maturity, sometimes by shortening it.
A second fact is that the effect of learning about competitors is strongly mediated by
the distribution of market shares. Specifically, lenders competing in concentrated markets
(measured by the HHI) or having larger market shares react much less or not at all to
observing competitor information. This pattern is not sensitive to the manner in which
we define market shares and concentration or to using relationship switching rates as an
alternative proxy for competitive pressure.
Additional results suggest that the conventional effects of information sharing in credit
markets cannot fully account for our findings. For instance, information can trigger "run-
like" behavior by creditors and financial distress for firms with multiple lenders (Hertzberg
et al., 2011). However, we do not find that lenders shorten their maturity systematically
3 In principle, the channel we document is nevertheless likely to apply to new borrowers as well.
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upon joining or that the effect is smaller for borrowers with a single relationship (for which
the incentives to run are muted).4 In addition, our findings are not driven by the revelation
of a borrower’s repayment history. This is interesting because borrower payment histories
are the most studied aspect of information sharing and strategic behavior in credit markets
(Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and have recently received credible empirical support (Foley
et al., 2018; Sutherland, 2018; Liberti et al., 2018). We emphasize instead a novel channel
of learning about competitors, which operates incrementally to more conventional channels.
For robustness, we address several important remaining threats to identification. As
discussed above, there could be shocks either to the borrower or lender that coincide with
the time of joining the platform and drive maturity independently of observing rivals’ offers.
On the borrower side, our results hold when comparing contracts made to the same borrower
by two lenders with different information sets: one that has joined the platform, the other
not. Specifically, we include borrower-time fixed effects (Khwaja and Mian, 2008) and find
the lender joining PayNet offers a maturity closer to the bureau average, relative to the other
lender in the same period.
On the lender side, joining the platform might coincide with a shift in business model
correlated with a propensity to offer specific contract terms. To address this concern, we
implement two additional tests that exploit the behavior of other lenders. First, we show our
result holds within lender-year across different market segments. Specifically, the information
coverage in the platform depends on contracts made by other lenders and thus varies by
collateral type over time in a way that is not directly driven by the decision to join.5 Including
lender-year fixed effects, we show that the maturity of collateral types with higher coverage
tracks the bureau average better than collateral types with low coverage. Second, we isolate
large shocks to bureau information arising from new lenders joining and show that incumbent
lenders’ contract terms better track those of their rivals once this information is available to
them. These additional tests support the interpretation that lenders adjust their contract
terms in reaction to the information revealed on the platform.
Which economic mechanisms might explain these results? Broadly speaking, there are
two (non-exclusive) possibilities. The first is rooted in classic oligopoly models of imperfect
competition, in which lenders react to competitors to preserve their market share. The
convergence in terms we observe suggests that contract terms are strategic complements and
4 Although all contracts are formally collateralized, there is still significant default risk. For instance, our
sample contains contracts to finance copiers and computers, whose value depreciates quickly, as well as
other equipment that is movable and therefore difficult to recover in default.
5 For example, after a truck captive joins there is a large increase in the platform’s coverage of truck contracts
but no new contracts for copiers. Thus lenders who had joined before this truck captive experience an
information shock for reasons beyond their control (they have no say over the truck captive joining) and
only to the extent they participate in the truck market.
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not that lenders choose to endogenously differentiate themselves from competitors by offering
a different contract (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). The evidence that this effect is mediated
by market share is also consistent with this view: dominant lenders have less incentive to
match rivals, as their market share is likely less sensitive to competing offers. Within credit
markets, Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011) also argue that strategic complementarities have
stronger effects in less concentrated markets.
The second kind of explanation is rooted in information aggregation or other social learn-
ing models: rivals’ offers reveal private information, which in turn can be used by lenders
to adjust their own terms. Note that this information comes from contracts offered to other
borrowers, which implies that it pertains to market-wide factors, as opposed to just borrower
idiosyncratic creditworthiness. In general, the relationship between information aggregation
and market structure is model-dependent, but our finding that the competitive fringe reacts
more is consistent with the Bustamante and Frésard (2017) model of learning from peers.
Overall, the findings of this paper support some existing models over others, although it is
challenging to fully discriminate among all alternatives, given that market power or beliefs
are not directly observable.
Finally, we investigate a key implication of our learning results. While a full welfare
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we examine the link between learning from com-
petitors and the incidence of delinquencies during the Great Recession. This episode is
revealing in that it consists of a large wave of unexpected defaults. For a group of lenders
joining the platform before the Great Recession, we compare the recession-period delinquen-
cies for contracts originated just before versus just after joining. Controlling for collateral
type-quarter, region-quarter, and lender fixed effects as well as borrower observables, we find
that matching competitors meant an increase in delinquencies. An interpretation in line with
our main findings is that lenders neglected future risk, either because of greater competition
or because they relied more on shared information at the expense of their own information
collection. In general, these findings echo those of Murfin and Pratt (2017a) and Goldstein
and Yang (2019) that technologies that increase the availability of competitor information
can have unintended consequences.
Related Works
This paper relates to a growing empirical literature studying how information and interac-
tions across lenders affect credit market outcomes. Murfin and Pratt (2017a) study compa-
rable pricing in the syndicated loan market. They find that past transactions impact new
transaction pricing but a failure to account for the overlap in information across loans leads
5
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to pricing mistakes. While our data lacks the power to trace out paths of influence as they
do, we nevertheless find suggestive evidence of learning about competitors leading to more
frequent delinquencies during the Great Recession. Hertzberg et al. (2011) provide clean evi-
dence on the role of public information in credit market coordination. Lenders react strongly
to the public revelation of information they already possess about a borrower. This publicity
effect triggers "run-like" behavior by creditors and financial distress for firms with multiple
lenders. By comparison, we study the effect of observing information about other lenders
and find evidence of a channel independent of creditor runs. Kang et al. (2019) study the
introduction of loan-level reporting requirements for the ECB repo borrowers that mandate
the disclosure of all contract terms, including prices. In a very different environment from
ours, they find convergence for price and non-price contract terms within banks.
In credit card markets, Liberman et al. (2018) study the equilibrium effects of information
deletion on the allocation of credit and risk, while Foley et al. (2018) show the impact of the
information environment on competition. Compared to these works and much of the earlier
literature on information sharing in credit markets, we study learning about competitors as
opposed to sharing information about borrowers. We also contribute to the literature that
studies the drivers of loan terms and specifically maturity. Hertzberg et al. (2018) provide
evidence from an online consumer lending platform, showing that loan maturity can be used
to screen borrowers based on their private information. In the auto loan market, Argyle
et al. (2017) show that borrowers display a demand for maturity and target low monthly
repayments, while Argyle et al. (2018) find that loan maturity impacts the pricing of cars.
The literature on information sharing and credit bureaus is vast, including works by
Jappelli and Pagano (2006), Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013), Sutherland (2018), Liberti
et al. (2018), Giannetti et al. (2017), Brown et al. (2009), Kovbasyuk and Spagnolo (2018),
and Balakrishnan and Ertan (2017), as is the literature studying the role of information in
lending markets more broadly (Hertzberg et al. (2010), Liberti et al. (2016), Hauswald and
Marquez (2003), Liberti (2017), Berger et al. (2017) and Ryan and Zhu (2018)). Finally,
an extensive literature has studied the role played by public firms and public markets in
diffusing information (Sockin and Xiong (2015), Chen et al. (2006), Foucault and Fresard
(2014), Dessaint et al. (2018), Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015), Veldkamp (2006), Leary and
Roberts (2014), Bustamante and Frésard (2017), and Badertscher et al. (2013)). In contrast,
we study private credit markets for which no centralized price exists, making information
technology the primary channel of information diffusion.
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1 Equipment Financing and PayNet
1.1 The PayNet Platform
Our data comes from PayNet, an information sharing platform focusing on the U.S. equip-
ment finance market and SMEs. Borrowers in this market seek loans and leases for an ar-
ray of assets, including agricultural, construction, manufacturing, medical, office, and retail
equipment as well as computers, copiers, and trucks. Lenders include banks, manufactur-
ers ("captives"), and independent finance companies.6 Since PayNet’s 2001 launch it has
attracted eight of the 10 largest lenders in the market, as well as several hundred others as
members. Like other credit bureaus, PayNet operates on the principle of reciprocity: mem-
bers must share information, and only members can purchase the credit files, credit scores,
and default probability products offered. PayNet gathers its data by directly connecting
into lenders’ IT systems, ensuring that the information shared is comprehensive, reliable,
and timely. PayNet has developed these products using 24 million contracts for over $1.6
trillion in transactions collected from members.
Prior to PayNet, lenders generally had access to very limited information about new
borrowers and other lenders. Competing data providers, such as Experian, offered limited
(and rarely timely) information about trade liabilities, which were much smaller than the
typical equipment contract. Public UCC filings documented the existence of a contract
but did not detail whether the borrower paid on time or the terms received. Thus PayNet
provided equipment finance lenders with a source of timely contract-level information about
a borrower’s ability to service similar liabilities and details on previous contracts it received.
This development was particularly relevant for small borrowers, who typically lacked audited
financial statements or public information about their creditworthiness (Berger et al., 2017).7
Although PayNet does not allow lenders to mine its data (e.g., by accessing all credit files for a
given industry or zip code), lenders can observe how their counterparts contract. During the
frequent process of accessing individual credit files, they can see the terms other lenders are
providing or have provided a given firm in the past. PayNet’s data collection and verification
process is further detailed by Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) and the online appendix of
Sutherland (2018).
Crucially, unlike many consumer credit bureaus, the platform includes detailed informa-
tion about contracts offered by competitors. Figure 1 illustrates the detailed information
available exclusively to PayNet members. The figure displays a snapshot of a (fictitious)
6 Murfin and Pratt (2017b) provide an explanation for the existence of captives in equipment financing.
7 We are not aware of any alternative to PayNet in which small borrowers can voluntary share information
with lenders in this market. See Glode et al. (2018) for a theoretical analysis.
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borrower’s credit file accessible on the platform in return for a fee. While the first page of
the credit file contains a summary of past payments as well as the borrower’s state, industry,
and age (omitted), subsequent pages reveal the terms of past and current contracts offered
by all lenders members of PayNet. In the example of Figure 1, the borrower had two lenders
and five contracts in total. For each contract, the maturity, amount, and delinquency status
are detailed.
However, similar to other credit bureaus (e.g., the consumer bureaus in the United
States), PayNet does not collect or distribute interest rate information and takes care that
it is not easily identifiable, for fear of potential collusion. On the one hand, this choice is
revealing and supports our hypothesis that information about competitors can have large
effects on credit market outcomes. On the other hand, it means that we cannot trace directly
the pricing implications of our hypothesis in this setting.
1.2 Sample
We construct our sample from the quarterly credit files of 20,000 borrowers randomly chosen
from PayNet’s database. The files contain detailed information for each of the borrower’s
current and past contracts with PayNet members. This information includes the contract’s
amount, maturity, payment frequency, collateral type, contract type, and delinquency status
as well as the borrower’s state, industry, and age. The data set provides a constant identifier
for borrowers and lenders, which we use to track contracting over time. One limitation is that
we cannot match lenders and borrowers to external data with this identifier. Importantly,
also note that while we have a large amount of information about lenders’ contract choices,
we cannot observe the universe of contracts in the bureau. This implies that an estimate
of the average of rivals’ contract terms, although unbiased, is measured with error. Such
measurement error can in general reduce the statistical significance of our results. A final
limitation of not observing the universe of lenders and contracts is limited statistical power
to study in detail the propagation of the effect across lenders and markets.
Our research question focuses on estimating the effect of observing competitors’ contract
terms on one’s own contract terms. We therefore restrict the sample of contracts used for
our main analysis to a relatively short window around the lender joining PayNet. We include
contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after the lender joins
the bureau. We only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after
joining the bureau in the given collateral type. This sample selection has little effect on the
distribution of loan terms in the population.
Sample statistics: Table 1 describes the lenders and borrowers that meet our regres-
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sion sample requirements described below. We have 2,076 unique borrowers and 44 unique
lenders involved in 8,194 credit relationships with 54,290 contracts. Relationships can span
multiple contracts, because a borrower’s needs for capital grow over time, and old assets
depreciate and new ones with updated features are released. The typical borrower maintains
two relationships; though because borrowers occasionally switch lenders, we observe more
relationships across the full sample period. Lenders on average maintain 94 relationships;
this understates their true scope, given we only observe a random snapshot of their clients.
Borrowers maintain multiple relationships, in part because lenders can specialize by collat-
eral type. A given firm may, for example, require both computers and forklifts and can access
different lenders to finance each. The average lender is exposed to just over six collateral
types and the average borrower to 1.7. Table A.1 illustrates the distribution of collateral
types in the sample. The five most common collateral types are copiers, trucks, construction
and mining equipment, computers, and agricultural equipment.
Oligopolistic competition: As in other credit markets for big-ticket items (cars, real
estate, etc.), borrowers in the equipment financing market transact at regular intervals and
search for and negotiate with lenders. For this reason, these markets tend not be defined
by a single market-clearing price (Argyle et al., 2018). At the same time, relationships
are prevalent, and lenders can exercise some degree of market power, with the degree of
competition affecting borrowers (Rice and Strahan, 2010). Nevertheless, market power likely
varies across market segments, consistent with the evidence in Murfin and Pratt (2017b),
Mian and Smith Jr. (1992), or Bodnaruk et al. (2016). Defining market segments as census
district (henceforth "region")-collateral type pairs, the median probability that a new contract
is issued with a previous lender is 70%, the 25th percentile is 55%, and the 75th percentile
is 92%.8 The median number of lenders in each segment is 12, with an interquartile range
of 5 to 31.
1.3 Contract Terms
Table 2 describes the terms for the typical contract in our regression sample. The median
contract size is $20,300, with an average of $101,000. The median maturity is 37 months
from origination; the average is 44.3 months. Eighty-one percent of contracts are some form
of lease (including true leases, conditional sales, and rental leases) while the remaining 19%
are loans.9 The overwhelming majority of contracts require fixed monthly payments. The
8 Throughout this paper, we use the term "region" to refer to one of the nine census divisions, described at
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us _regdiv.pdf
9 The borrower’s choice between a lease or a loan can depend on many considerations, including cost, tax or
financial reporting treatment, different services offered under each contract type, the borrower’s credit risk
and liquidity, and obsolescence risk. For our purposes, these contracts function similarly. In the context
9
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level of these contract terms are broadly similar before and after a lender joins the platform,
although these levels are affected by changes in lender and borrower composition over time.
Our analyses study contract maturity, for two reasons. First, maturity impacts firms’
liquidity and investments. During the Great Recession, maturity on loans lasting over a year
fell by 30% between 2007 and 2010 before recovering slowly (Survey of Terms of Business
Lending). Figures 3 and 4 show that contracts in our sample also display considerable
time variation throughout the business cycle. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018) provide extensive
evidence that short maturities and rollover risk were responsible for a large share of the drop
in firm investment during the recent recession. Milbradt and Oehmke (2015) also argue that
loan maturity has real effects by distorting firms’ decisions toward inefficiently short-term
investments. Second, maturity is an important variable to allocate risk and credit. In our
context of financing a specific piece of equipment, contract size is largely dictated by the
equipment needed, but short maturity protects the lender against a deterioration in the
borrower’s financial position. Indeed, the corporate finance literature has shown that, in
the presence of frictions, non-price loan terms are key to credit access, maturity being a
prominent example (see Tirole (2010) for a summary). Since maturity and prices are not
perfect substitutes, studying contract maturity is relevant, even though interest rates are
not reported in our data.10
Moreover, maturity choices appear to be far from mechanical and display substantial
unexplained variation in the cross-section of borrowers and lenders over our sample period.
The raw standard deviation is 17 months, a little less than half of the sample mean. Table
A.2 in the appendix shows that only about a third of this variation can be explained by
collateral type, year, and borrower-lender fixed effects. In the analysis below, we analyze the
dispersion in contract terms by computing, for each contract, the gap between its maturity
and the bureau’s average maturity (excluding the lender’s own contracts) for that collateral
type in the previous quarter. The median gap in our sample is 11 months, which is a
substantial fraction of the underlying variation in maturity choice.
1.4 Lender Participation in PayNet
When a lender joins PayNet, it gains access to information about others’ contracts but must
share information about its own contracts, including past contracts. This is enforced through
PayNet’s direct access into lenders’ IT systems and extensive audit and testing procedures.
of captive financing, Murfin and Pratt (2017b) highlight the fundamental similarities of leases and loans.
10 Hertzberg et al. (2018) document that demand for maturity is heterogeneous in consumer credit markets
and that maturity can be used screen applicants. We abstract from screening by focusing on repeat
borrowers.
10
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This back-fill requirement is crucial to our empirical design: We can observe contracts made
before and after the lender joins. This allows us to study changes in contracting between the
same firm and lender during a relatively short window around the lender joining PayNet.
Another key feature of our setting is that lenders join in a staggered pattern over the
sample period. This variation offers two benefits. First, the platform information is not
publicly revealed: in the same period, some lenders have access to it, while others competing
in the same market do not. This within market-period, across-lender variation allows us to
distinguish the effects of the new information from other events affecting lenders or borrowers
in a given year. Second, the information revealed to entrants by the platform varies over time
as a function of what other lenders are offering. Indeed, lenders often specialize by collateral
type; therefore the bureau coverage across collateral types evolves in a nonsystematic pattern.
Thus members regularly experience shocks to the information coverage in their markets
driven by other lenders, which is by construction outside of their control.11 We leverage
these additional sources of variation in our main specification and robustness tests.
Table 3 shows the variation in entry timing for lenders meeting our sample criteria de-
scribed in Section 3. Lenders join in all years between 2002 and 2014 except one. While
large lenders tend to join earlier than small ones, in most years, a variety of lenders join.
At the same time, joining PayNet is voluntary, and the timing of joining the platform is not
randomly assigned. In section 2.6 below, we perform a series of tests to ensure that results
are not driven by lender or borrower shocks coinciding with the timing of joining. Note also
that Liberti et al. (2018) study in detail the decision to join PayNet and show that a key
driver of lenders’ joining is access to new markets, but our tests are performed exclusively
within an existing relationship. Note also that our sample of lenders differs by design that
of Liberti et al. (2018) in that, given our purpose, we impose a different event window and
sample requirements, as described in Section 2.4.
2 Learning About Competitors
2.1 An Illustrative Framework
How do lenders react to observing their competitors’ contract terms? Credibly answering
this question presents some empirical challenges. To help explain our empirical approach,
we sketch a simple illustrative framework in which lenders have dispersed information about
their borrowers as well as their competitors. We use the model to describe the effect of
11 Figure A.1 in the online appendix shows there is considerable time variation in the volume of contracts
in the bureau across collateral types.
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joining the platform on contract maturity, as well as how we empirically account for some
important confounders. However, because our data is silent on these issues, we do not
explicitly provide microfoundations for the market game nor for the joint optimization of
maturity and pricing. The main text is limited to notation and key ideas, while the appendix
contains more details.12
A lender’s optimal contract terms depend on two factors: (i) fundamentals, such as
borrower credit risk and the lender’s risk tolerance, and (ii) the lender’s competitors’ terms,
due to imperfect competition. Lenders have access to some public information as well as
private signals about both factors. We can decompose lender l’s choice of maturity m to
firm f , which is part of a group of similar firms g, linearly as follows:
m
f
l = m
g
0︸︷︷︸
public information
+ E[φg|Il]︸ ︷︷ ︸
borrower fundamentals
+ αE[mg
−l|Il]︸ ︷︷ ︸
competitors’ terms
+ ηlf︸︷︷︸
idiosyncratic to relationship
Fundamentals are denoted by φg and competitors’ terms by mg
−l. The degree to which
lenders care directly about their competitors’ terms is denoted by α and summarizes the
nature and degree of competition faced by the lender for this borrower. Given that borrowers
plausibly value longer maturity, the probability that a contract offer is accepted increases
in the lender’s own term ml and decreases in rivals’ terms m−l. This would naturally lead
to strategic complementarities: the optimal maturity choice m∗l increases with the lender’s
belief of its rivals’ offers (α > 0). On the other hand, the industrial organization literature
has also raised the possibility that rivals choose to differentiate themselves through product
choice as in Shaked and Sutton (1982) (α < 0). Our empirical test does not take a stand on
the direction of the response.
Finally, the idiosyncratic term ηlf includes borrower characteristics, news about its cred-
itworthiness, or shocks to the lender’s balance sheet that affect its propensity to lend.
Crucially, lenders are uncertain about both fundamentals and their competitors’ actions.
Before joining PayNet, lenders have two sources of information: (1) public information about
fundamentals or competitors’ terms that can be gleaned from, for instance, forecasts of
local and national economic conditions or industry reports, summarized in m0 = (m
φ
0 ,m
m
0 ),
and (2) private signals sl = (s
φ
l , s
m
l ), reflecting the lender’s own effort to determine the
appropriate contract maturity.
After joining the platform, lenders can also observe an additional signal: the average
terms offered by competitors (m¯g) to similar borrowers.13 In equilibrium, the maturity choice
12 The mathematical notation borrows from canonical "beauty contest" models exemplified by Morris and
Shin (2002). Note, however, that we use it for a different purpose and the underlying economics and
microfoundations differ.
13 Concretely, lenders can learn about others’ terms by purchasing individual credit files from PayNet. This
12
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depends on the information available to the lender at the time. Before joining, lenders put
some weight on their own private signals, depending on their respective precision. After
joining, lenders place less weight on their own private signals and place some weight on the
bureau average.
This paper’s investigation is empirical. Questions related to information and imperfect
competition are notoriously difficult to study, and our focus is on providing novel, credible
evidence on how lenders react to learning about competitors. Predictions from theoretical
models are complex and often ambiguous, as emphasized by Vives (2006). Our contribution
is to estimate the sign and magnitude of this reaction in our setting as well as testing
whether it is driven by important features of the environment, specifically market structure.
Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss potential channels at play, although fully distinguishing
among them is beyond the scope of this paper.
Lenders can react to information m¯g about their competitors through two broad, non-
exclusive channels, as can be seen from the decomposition above. First, there can be a direct
strategic effect: a change in contract terms helps preserve or grow market shares (oligopoly
channel). This effect comports with modern industrial organization models focusing on
imperfect competition with incomplete information. Intuitively, the market for financing
equipment is not centralized, and not all lenders offer the same contract terms in equilibrium.
Instead, buyers search for good deals, and lenders’ choice of terms is driven by attracting
or retaining borrowers. The profit-maximizing contract terms balance a higher probability
that a contract is accepted with a lower profit margin on that contract. Learning about
competitors is valuable because it helps solve this trade-off optimally.14 The sign of the effect,
however, is ambiguous: it depends whether strategic complementarities or the differentiation
motives dominate.
Second, there can be an indirect inference effect: competitors’ actions partly reveal their
private signals, which are informative about fundamentals, such as credit risk or borrower
demand in the economy (information aggregation channel). Note the differences from the
previous channel. The oligopoly channel emphasizes that lenders care about others’ actions
per se, while here lenders care because of what they represent: maturities partially reveal
competitors’ private information that was used to make this choice. As opposed to learning
about a specific borrower from its payment history, information aggregation postulates that
makes it unlikely they can learn the entire distribution of competitors’ terms or that they can leak this
information easily.
14 In the language of classical IO models, the optimal price set by a producer equates inverse residual demand
elasticity with the profit margin. Learning about competitors leads to a better estimate of this elasticity.
The same logic applies to maturity choice, in a joint model of lending in which interest rates and maturity
are not perfect substitutes.
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lenders use the bureau information to extrapolate to other similar borrowers (e.g., with
respect to size, sector, or collateral type). The rational expectations version of this effect
is canonical in the context of financial markets (Hellwig, 1980) but has been much less
explored within credit markets. Importantly, at this stage, we want to include under this
broad channel other social learning models that are less "rational" or "efficient" in nature,
such as information cascades or naive herding (Murfin and Pratt, 2017a) as well as rational
models with endogenous information acquisition. We include these different forces under the
"information aggregation" label. Section 3 will re-examine all these channels in the light of
our main empirical findings and discuss the potential efficiency implications.
2.2 Empirical Approach
The main identification threat in isolating the effect of learning about competitors is the
existence of unobserved common shocks. Maturity choices are naturally correlated across
agents, due to public information m0 as well as private signals {sl}, independent of the
information revealed by the bureau. Then lenders might start offering certain terms at the
same time, not because they respond to each other but simply because they react to the same
news about fundamentals. The main contribution of our empirical strategy is to specifically
account for these unobserved common components.
To address this challenge, we exploit the time dimension associated with the lender joining
PayNet. Joining leads to a shift in the lender’s information set. Importantly, lenders join in
a staggered fashion: an individual lender gaining access to PayNet does not coincide with a
release of public information to all lenders. Our main specification measures how maturity
changes within a relationship over a short window around the lender joining. While a lender’s
terms may track the bureau average before joining, we ask whether they track it relatively
better or worse afterward.
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of this idea, focusing on the case of convergence
for simplicity. Because of common shocks, the lender’s terms are correlated with competitors’
even before joining the platform. However, they track the bureau average relatively better
after joining. This would be consistent with lenders mimicking competitors. A divergence
in terms would generate the opposite pattern, with lenders’ terms generally tracking the
bureau worse after joining. In the data, we can follow lender-borrower relationships over
time, including the time before the lender joined the platform. We can also observe rivals’
offers before as well after the lender joins. This allows us to test this prediction directly
within a fixed effect regression framework.
14
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2.3 Addressing Confounders
By construction, our empirical strategy is not confounded by the existence of a number of
factors: public information unobservable to econometrician m0, other sources of information
outside of the platform sl, or idiosyncratic loan terms ηlf . Indeed, all of these forces exist in
the framework above, and our tests based on comparing before and after joining are valid,
independent of the sequence of realization of any of these shocks. This is the main advantage
of our approach.
However, a necessary assumption for identification is that the precision or dispersion of
these other shocks is constant, within fixed effects groups, around the time lenders join.
While this assumption is considerably weaker than assuming that no such shocks exist, it
cannot be taken for granted. Specifically, the identification strategy creates the possibility
of two important confounders. Specifically, lenders’ responses might be driven by (i) in-
formation in the platform other than rivals’ offers, namely the revelation of the borrower’s
repayment history, or (ii) by shocks unrelated to the platform information but whose timing
coincides with the decision to join. We take both concerns seriously and design our main
specification as well as additional tests to address them as best we can.
Revelation of borrower past repayment history: Contract terms offered to a bor-
rower can be influenced by what a lender learns from the borrower’s PayNet credit file. Note,
however, that we restrict attention to lending to previous borrowers, for which the credit file
is not necessarily informative. For instance, we show in additional tests that our main result
holds for borrowers with a single relationship, for which the credit file carries no additional
information.
Other shocks correlated with joining PayNet: The decision to join the platform
is voluntary and can therefore depend on a number of factors that could affect maturity,
independent of the information revealed by the bureau. On this front, note that Liberti et al.
(2018) show that lenders joining PayNet are motivated by a desire to enter new markets.
However, our main test is exclusively within existing markets. In addition, in Section 2.6, we
show that borrower or lender shocks coinciding with the timing of joining cannot explain our
results by conducting a series of additional within borrower-time tests (Khwaja and Mian,
2008) as well as tests leveraging the decision of other lenders to join PayNet.
2.4 Main Specification and Findings
We design our main specification to answer the following question: does the contract maturity
for the same borrower match the lender’s rivals’ maturities better after the lender joins the
bureau? For each contract, the dependent variable is a measure of the "gap" |m∗i−m¯| between
15
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the maturity offered by the lender and what rivals are offering for similar transactions. The
variable of interest is a "Post Joining" dummy, equal to 0 for contracts issued before joining
PayNet and 1 for those issued after. A negative coefficient on δpost < 0 implies that lenders
react to the bureau information by offering terms more similar to those of competitors.
Importantly, we can account for heterogeneous deviations from average maturity by including
a series of granular fixed effects.
Specifically, the main specification estimates the following fixed effect regression:
log |mlfc,t −mc,t−1| = δpost + ηlf + αt + νcontract + εlfc,t (1)
The unit of observation is a contract signed between firm f and lender l to finance a piece
of equipment. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to
four quarters after the lender joins the bureau. Because our predictions concern the intensive
margin, we only study lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after joining
the bureau in the given collateral type.
The dependent variable is the log of absolute value of the gap between the contract
maturity at origination and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the
previous quarter mc,t−1, excluding the lender’s own contracts.
15 We show robustness to
using different measures of rivals’ offers below. Importantly, recall that our data set is
constructed from a random sample of 20,000 borrowers’ quarterly credit files. We therefore
cannot observe the universe of contracts in the bureau, and this power concern restricts how
finely we can measure rivals’ offers.
The parameter of interest is the coefficient δpost. To control for heterogeneous deviations
from average maturity, we add a series of fixed effects. ηlf is a borrower-lender fixed effect that
accounts for idiosyncratic time-invariant maturity at the relationship level, including industry
and regional variation. Given that lenders join at different times, we include time fixed effects
αt to allow for aggregate time series patterns in maturity. Finally, we include controls νcontract
for each of the three contract size categories, whether the contract is classified as a lease or
a loan, and each borrower risk category based on prior delinquencies.16
To lend support to the empirical strategy, Table A.3 in the appendix reports pre-trends
for contract terms before joining the platform. For the entire distribution of loan size and
15 Excluding the lender’s own contract and using a lag addresses the mechanical aspects of the reflection
problem of Manski (1993). Exploiting the timing of joining PayNet accounts for the existence of common
shocks, as explained in detail above.
16 Specifically, the three contract size categories are: small ticket (below $250k), medium ticket (between
$250k and $5M), and big ticket (above $5M). The three delinquencies categories are: no missed payments,
missed payments 90 or fewer days late, and default or missed payments over 90 days late, all measured
over the last three years.
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maturity, there is virtually no difference a quarter before joining, relative to a year prior
to joining. The distribution of the gap relative to the bureau average also does not display
any particular trend. The lack of pre-trends also assuages concerns about survivorship bias.
Because our Post Joining variable captures the passage of time, it is identified only for
borrowers with a contract before and after their lender joins PayNet. While in principle the
passage of time (i.e., survival) can be correlated with borrower characteristics, we do not see
this pattern prior to joining. In fact, the dynamic coefficient plots in Figure 5 below show
that the change in maturity happens on impact, the quarter after the lender joins PayNet.
Table 4 presents the main result of estimating Equation 1. It shows that, upon joining
PayNet, the gap between a lender’s maturity and the bureau average falls by 6% to 7% in
absolute value. This effect reveals that observing new information about competitors leads
lenders to offer maturities closer to what others are offering. The effect is virtually unchanged
whether we use quarter, year, or collateral-year fixed effects to account for aggregate time
variation. Table 5 shows that the effect appears to be symmetric in that maturity itself
does not change on average, only the gap relative to rivals changes. Column 2 confirms that
lenders adjust terms in both directions.
Economically, this effect on borrowers is likely to be sizeable. While the the average effect
implies only a one-month change in contract maturity, it masks a large effect on rollover risk
for some borrowers. Indeed, it corresponds to a 10% probability of a six-months or larger
change in contract maturity, as suggested by unreported regressions that use six-months bins
of contract maturity.17 Moreover, for the subset of borrowers with fully amortizing contracts,
a back of the envelope calculation suggests a 2% change in monthly payments, equivalent to
a 2 percentage point change in APR.18
Table 6 shows that our finding is robust to a number of alternative specifications, both
in terms of economic magnitude and statistical significance. To account for heterogeneous
shocks to collateral types across regions, column 1 calculates the bureau average by collateral
type-region-quarter, instead of collateral type-quarter, and yields a similar estimate. Column
2 shows that our results are unchanged if we drop contracts originated during the crisis years
of 2008–2009. Column 3 shows that our results are not driven by small collateral types with
fewer than 100 observations, for which the bureau average is likely measured with a significant
amount of error.
17 Contract maturities are often multiples of six months.
18 For example, the median contract is for $20,000 and 37 months, which corresponds to a $678 payment
per month. Reducing maturity to 36 months increases monthly payments to $693, roughly comparable
to increasing the interest rate from 15% to 17% ($698). Since we cannot directly observe interest rates
nor any embedded options in our data, this calculation relies on Schalheim and Zhang (2017)’s estimate
of the mean annualized interest rate of 15% during this period.
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We then perform two placebo tests. First, in column 4, we calculate the bureau average
using contracts from one year ago instead of current contracts. We expect lenders to react
less to stale information. Second, in column 5, we calculate the bureau average using an
unrelated collateral type, based on the relatedness measure introduced in Liberti et al. (2018).
For both placebo tests, we find null results. Moreover, unreported results show that the effect
is not tied to whether the lender joins early or late in our sample period.
We make three comments regarding the implications of this main finding. First, recall
that our data does not allow us to trace the pricing implications of this effect, as interest rates
are not shared in the platform. If prices were shared, lenders might react to this information
as well. Generally, since interest rates and maturity are not perfect substitutes, a change
in maturity can have real effects. For instance, Argyle et al. (2018) provide evidence that
maturity impacts the pricing of cars in auto loan markets. Undoing a maturity change by
increasing rates could also turn borrowers away or increase their debt burden and credit risk.
Second, note that for econometric reasons our tests is restricted to existing borrower-lender
relationships. However, in principle this effect would apply to new borrowers as well. For
example, better information about competitors’ offers is particularly valuable when trying to
poach borrowers. Nevertheless, cleanly isolating this effect for new borrowers is particularly
challenging. Finally, it is plausible that the change in lender behavior upon joining PayNet
in turn affects other lenders, implying that there can be knock-on effects that propagate
and amplify the initial effect, either through competition or learning. For instance, Murfin
and Pratt (2017a) document pricing mistakes by tracing out "paths of influence" across
syndicated loans and show how these mistakes are propagated across time in this market.
However, the fact that we do not observe the universe of lenders and contracts limits our
ability to study propagation in detail in our setting.
2.5 The Role of Market Structure
A natural question to ask is whether the effect of learning about competitors is mediated
by market structure. For instance, the oligopoly channel suggests that market power is a
key driver of incentives to match rivals. Indeed, lenders in a dominant position and whose
market share is less sensitive to competitors face little pressure to respond to what others
are offering.
To investigate this, we construct different measures capturing the distribution of market
shares.19 Across markets, we first measure concentration according to HHI. We define a
"market" either at the collateral type-contract size category level or at the collateral type-
19 Direct measures of market power are hard to obtain outside a fully structural model. Therefore we
interpret our results with caution.
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contract size category-region level, because lenders might compete locally or nationally. To
alleviate concerns that local market concentration is directly affected by information sharing,
we compute market concentration at the beginning of 2001, before PayNet was introduced.
There is considerable variation in concentration across market segments: moving from the
25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution implies a 0.15-0.20 increase in the HHI. We also
use relationship switching rates as an alternative measure of market competitiveness. Some
market segments see more relationship switching than others, presumably because of their
unique degree of product differentiation, specialization, or other switching costs. Finally, we
also construct a within-market across-lender measure that flags lenders that are among the
five largest in a collateral type-region-quarter. This classification allows us to distinguish
between dominant lenders and the competitive fringe. Table A.4 in the appendix shows
summary statistics for these measures.
Table 7 shows that our learning results are strongly mediated by market structure. All
measures of market structure point in the same direction. The first two columns show that
the effect is driven by markets with low levels of concentration. In these less concentrated
markets, the gap between the lender’s maturity and the bureau average falls by 8% after
joining, while it is statistically unchanged in markets with high concentration levels. Column
3 confirms these findings by showing that the effect is driven by markets with high relation-
ship switching rates. Finally, Column 4 suggests the same interpretation: lenders in the
competitive fringe are more responsive to information about their competitors, although the
distinction is statistically weaker in this specification. While the point estimate is two times
larger for the competitive fringe than for the top five lenders, the p-value of the coefficient
difference is 0.32.
Figure 5 illustrates the full dynamics of the effect across subsamples with high and low
market concentrations, respectively. Each panel plots the coefficients of a version of Equation
1 in which each quarter before and after joining has its own dummy variable. The omitted
category is the quarter prior to joining and is labeled as time zero. For this graph, we
extend the window to two years around joining PayNet. The left panel shows that, in the
most-concentrated markets, the gap between a lender’s terms and the bureau average is
unaffected by joining. The right panel paints a different picture for the least-concentrated
markets. After joining, there is a significant and persistent fall in the gap, implying that
lenders adjust their terms toward what others are offering. The gradual reduction in the gap
is intuitive: because lenders cannot mine the database, it takes time to aggregate and use
the information about rivals contained in individual credit files. It is also possible that the
effect grows over time, as lenders learn from each other sequentially. Statistically, there are
no significant pre-trends, although the data is somewhat noisy four quarters prior to joining.
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2.6 Other Shocks Coinciding with the Lender Joining PayNet
Joining PayNet is voluntary and not randomly assigned. Therefore we cannot exclude the
possibility that our results are due to factors other than the bureau information that drives
both the decision to join and maturity choices. Relatedly, note that access to new markets
is the key driver of lenders’ joining PayNet (Liberti et al., 2018). However, our main test is
exclusively within existing markets: it includes lender-borrower fixed effects and is restricted
to lenders with contracts in a given collateral type before and after joining. Note also that
Table A.3 and Figure 5 reveal no discernible pre-trends in our dependent variable prior to
joining. Nevertheless, we leverage the granularity of our data and conduct a number of
robustness tests to directly address this threat to identification.
Accounting for Borrower Shocks: On the borrower side, we exploit the fact that,
in a given period, some lenders to the same borrower have access to the platform, while
others do not. We can use this across-lender variation to distinguish the effects of the new
information from other events affecting a given borrower in a given year. Specifically, we
include borrower-year fixed effects for the subset of borrowers with multiple lenders:
log |mlfc,t −mc,t−1| = δpost + ηlf + ζft + νcontract + εlfc,t (2)
Table 8 shows the results of this extended specification. As before, the gap between a lender’s
maturity and the bureau average falls after joining in competitive market segments but is
unchanged in others. The coefficient reflects the reduction in the gap after joining, relative
to other lenders of the firm in the post period. This more stringent specification alleviates
the concern that results are driven by shocks to borrower demand or creditworthiness that
coincide with the lender’s decision to join PayNet.
Accounting for Lender Shocks: On the lender side, joining PayNet might coincide
with a business model shift, which is potentially correlated with the propensity to offer
specific contract maturities. To address this concern, we design two additional tests that
exploit the behavior of other lenders. Specifically, the information coverage in the bureau
depends on contracts originated by others and thus varies by collateral type over time in
a way that is not directly driven by one’s own decision to join. For example, after lenders
join, they have no control over how the bureau’s membership or collateral market coverage
evolves. Any given year could see non-systematic changes in bureau coverage across collateral
types based on who else joins, and these coverage changes affect the precision of the bureau
average.
In the first test, we leverage this variation driven by other lenders to check whether
our result holds within lender-year across different collateral types. We can ask whether
20
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the maturity of collateral types with higher coverage tracks the bureau average better than
collateral types with low coverage. Concretely, we augment Equation 1 by adding two
elements:
log |mlfc,t −mc,t−1| = δpost ∗ V olumec,t−1 + ηlf + ξlt + νcontract + εlfc,t (3)
First, the main coefficient of interest is now the Post×Volume interaction, where Volume is
defined as the number of open contracts in the bureau of the same collateral type as of the
previous quarter.20 Second, we include a lender-year fixed effect ξlt that absorbs any change
in lenders’ supply that is constant across collateral types within a year. Panel A of Table
9 shows the results for this extended specification. The estimated coefficients are consistent
with our main finding. For a given lender joining in a specific quarter, the maturity of
collateral types with higher coverage tracks the bureau average better than collateral types
with low coverage and only so in the most-competitive market segments. Columns 3 and 4
also include borrower-year fixed effects for robustness and arrive at the same results.
In the second test, we ask whether lenders react to large information shocks due to others
joining PayNet. We implement this test in three steps. First, for each lender, we identify
its primary collateral type—the one that lender most frequently finances. Second, for each
lender, we identify an event quarter after the lender joined when the bureau experiences the
largest increase in contract coverage for the primary collateral type. Although some lenders
will share primary collateral types, their staggered joining results in different event quarters.
Third, for each lender, we estimate a variant of Equation 1 around the event quarter, where
the Post dummy is now defined relative to each lender’s event quarter. Panel B of Table 9
shows the results for this alternative specification. Consistent with our interpretation that
lenders react to information about competitors contained in the platform, contract maturities
are closer to rivals’ average following a large information inflow after the lender has joined
PayNet. Overall, these additional results alleviate the concern that our main findings are
purely driven by factors behind the decision to join.
3 Interpreting the Findings and Implications
3.1 Conventional Channels of Information Sharing
The previous section provides robust evidence that lenders react to learning about their
competitors. In this section, we put this result into perspective with more conventional
20 We omit the level effect of Volume in the regression equation for brevity.
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channels of information sharing in credit markets. We do not claim that these channels are
not at play in general; in fact, previous work using PayNet data suggests some of them are
operating in our setting (Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013), Sutherland (2018), Liberti et al.
(2018)). We argue only that our findings cannot be fully explained by these conventional
channels.
Revelation of Credit History: A key role of credit bureaus is to create credit files that
reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. The revelation of borrowers’
payment histories affects the amount of credit and contract terms. Part of this channel
works through a change in the composition of borrowers: worse borrowers are screened out
or offered harsher terms, while better borrowers receive better offers (Foley et al., 2018).
However, by design, our tests keep the composition of borrower-lender pairs constant by
including relationship fixed effects. The effect we document is therefore a change in maturity
within a relationship. The revelation of credit histories can affect an existing relationship
if a borrower has multiple lenders. Accessing the bureau can reveal negative information to
the lender that the borrower tried to keep secret previously.
If this channel were driving our result, we expect that it would be smaller or absent for
borrowers with (1) a good credit history and (2) a single relationship, because for them the
credit file would contain no new information.21 However, Table 10 reveals that there is no
significant difference in the effect for borrowers with bad credit records or single relationship
borrowers.
Creditor Runs: Alternatively, lenders can react to observing others’ terms due to
the fear of a creditor run.22 For instance, Hertzberg et al. (2011) illustrates the effect of
information sharing on lender coordination. In the context of maturity choice, Brunnermeier
and Oehmke (2013) emphasize the risk of a "maturity rat race," in which new lenders offer
short maturities in an effort to front-run existing creditors. In general, these incentives to
run lead to strategic complementarities in maturity choice that could explain a convergence
in maturities after joining the bureau. Although all contracts are formally associated with a
specific piece of equipment, there is still significant default risk. Nevertheless, several pieces
of evidence speak against an explanation based on run-like behavior of creditors. First,
recall from Table 5 that lenders do not shorten their maturities systematically upon joining:
lenders adjust their terms toward what others are offering, in both directions. Second, the
aforementioned findings in Table 10 contradict a run interpretation; the effect is equally
21 It may be news that the borrower does not have a relationship with any other lender. Nevertheless, we
would expect this piece of news to be substantially less informative than a full credit history.
22 More broadly, a number of papers have emphasized the role of information in explaining run-like behavior,
such as Morris and Shin (1998), Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011), Goldstein et al. (2011), Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005).
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strong for borrowers with good credit records or with a single relationship for which the
incentives to run are muted.
3.2 Learning about Competitors: Revisiting the Channels
The illustrative framework presented in Section 2.1 suggests two potential broad, non-
exclusive channels of learning about competitors: the oligopoly channel and the information
aggregation channel. We revisit them in light of the our evidence. Overall, the evidence
above support some existing channels over others. Nevertheless, it is challenging to fully dis-
criminate among all alternative models, given that market power or beliefs are not directly
observable.
Oligopolistic Competition: under this channel, lenders respond to competitors’ offers
to preserve or grow their market share. Interestingly, industrial organization models can
disagree on the sign of the effect. Indeed, lenders might try to preserve the demand for
their product by matching rivals’ terms or by trying to differentiate themselves (Shaked
and Sutton, 1982). Our evidence of lenders adjusting toward what others are offering is
consistent with the first view, i.e., that maturity choices are strategic complements in our
setting. In general, this fact can have important implications, because it is well known that
strategic complementarities help propagate shocks throughout the economy (Angeletos and
Lian, 2016). Strategic complementarities are also crucial to determining the total effect of
lifting barriers to entry, as they dictate the strength of the response of incumbents to entrants
contesting the market.
Moreover, our findings that the effect is mediated by market structure are in line with this
view. Lenders in a dominant position and whose market share is less sensitive to competitors
face little pressure to respond to what others are offering. Conceptually, lenders’ "market
power" should predict the strength of the effect.
Ideally, we would also use data on applications to measure directly how the take-up rate of
a lender’s offer depends on rivals’ maturity, as in Argyle et al. (2018). Unfortunately, PayNet
does not collect data on applications, and we can only measure actual market shares. Actual
market shares are not enough to test the channel directly, because they are determined in
equilibrium. For example, a producer might reduce its price to try to attract demand, but
its rivals have incentives to adjust their own price as well. Market shares might therefore
not change significantly, although market participants are reacting strongly to each other.
Information Aggregation: There can also be an inference effect: competitors’ actions
partly reveal their private signals, which are informative about fundamentals such as credit
risk or borrower demand in the economy. As opposed to learning about a specific borrower’s
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credit file, this channel postulates that lenders look at the bureau information to extrapo-
late to similar borrowers. The rational expectations version of this effect has been studied
extensively, but at this stage, other social learning models, such as information cascades or
naive herding (Murfin and Pratt, 2017a), are equally plausible. The unifying theme is that
learning about competitors reduces the lender’s reliance on its own private information.
We cannot directly measure lenders’ beliefs, so instead we ask how this class of models
squares with our cross-sectional evidence. Conceptually, the information aggregation channel
does not suggest a clear-cut prediction with respect to the role of market structure. The
main reason is that the canonical models tend to be cast in terms of a competitive financial
market or through a sequence of decision-making problems. Recent work has incorporated
elements of strategic behavior, and a consensus has yet to emerge (Vives, 2011; Bernhardt
and Taub, 2015; Rostek and Weretka, 2015). Our finding that the competitive fringe reacts
more strongly is, however, consistent with the model of learning from peers in Bustamante
and Frésard (2017).
To provide additional evidence, we compare the behavior of specialist lenders relative to
others joining the platform. Although this is an imperfect proxy for differences in informa-
tion, the idea is that specialist lenders may have more-precise private information and thus
put less weight on others’ terms when deciding what to offer.23 We include five definitions
of lender specialization, with the intent of capturing lenders that have expertise in a market
segment. The first two define specialization as the number of quarters since the lender’s first
contract originated in this collateral type or collateral type-region category. The next two
define a lender as a specialist for a specific collateral type if that collateral type is either
the most common or one of the top three originated by that lender. Finally, we define a
lender as a specialist for a collateral type if that collateral type constitutes at least 30% of
its lending portfolio. If information aggregation explains our main results, then specialists
should adjust their terms relatively less upon observing others’ terms. However, the special-
ist interaction is typically small, of the wrong sign, and insignificant, as displayed in Table
A.5 in the appendix. While this is only a cross-sectional prediction, we do not find direct
evidence in favor of this information channel.
3.3 Implications
Our learning results go beyond conventional mechanisms of the effects of information sharing.
Interestingly, across many markets the rise in big data and algorithm developments is making
learning about competitors increasingly easier. The debate on the effect of information
23 Stroebel (2016), Kurlat and Stroebel (2015), and Loutskina and Strahan (2011) also exploit heterogeneity
in expertise in the context of real estate markets.
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sharing on market behavior has therefore resurfaced recently. Our findings speak, in a
novel way, to the interaction between information and market competition that has been
emphasized in the literature (Vives, 2006; Jappelli and Pagano, 2000).
The economic forces at play are subtle. On the one hand, information from competitors
could facilitate collusion. On the other, pooling information can be beneficial: it can im-
prove production efficiency or remove barriers to competition. Similarly, having access to
more information can backfire if "mistakes" are propagated as opposed to corrected when
information is shared. For instance, Murfin and Pratt (2017a) document in detail how the
use of comparables leads to pricing mistakes in the syndicated loan market. Goldstein and
Yang (2019) argues that in general the market-quality implications of information disclosure
are subtle and can crowd out the production of private information.
To relate these questions to our setting, we examine one consequence of learning about
competitors by studying delinquencies during the Great Recession. This is an interesting
episode, as it led to wave of defaults that was difficult to predict. Broadly speaking, there
are two potential, not mutually exclusive, channels that could increase delinquencies. First,
enhanced competition can lead lenders to neglect risk as they compete aggressively to pre-
serve their market share today. Second, reliance on hard information, such as credit reports
and scores, exposes lenders to significant losses caused by negative shocks that are not an-
ticipated by the hard information. Rajan et al. (2015) document this phenomenon in the
market for securitized subprime mortgages during this period.24
We exploit the staggered timing of lenders’ joining and study how contracts originated
prior to the crisis performed during it. Specifically, for each lender joining between 2005 and
2007, we study the 2008-2009 performance of contracts originated shortly before joining,
compared to contracts originated shortly after joining. Our assumption, based on our prior
tests, is that lenders do more firm-specific screening before joining and rely more on shared
information after and react to what rivals are offering. In addition to lender fixed effects,
our tests include indicators for the quarter of origination for each collateral type and the
quarter of origination for each borrower region. These last controls ensure that our results are
not driven by lending to different cohorts with differential (and potentially region-specific)
default risk.
Table 11 shows that contracts originated just after the lender joined experienced more
crisis-period delinquencies than the contracts originated by the same lender just before.
Specifically, the post-join contracts experienced approximately 0.3 more quarters of delin-
quency from 2008 to 2009 than the pre-join contracts. One interpretation is that a desire to
24 More generally, this is related to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1983). See also Farboodi et al. (2018) for a
recent discussion of how the use of information by the stock market can deviate from the social optimal.
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match competitors can backfire if lenders overlook fundamental sources of risk.
Admittedly, this is not the only possible explanation, and although our data cannot reject
alternatives with absolute confidence, we offer additional pieces of supporting evidence. First,
in line with our prior results, we also find that the delinquency increase is entirely driven
by markets with low levels of market concentration, as shown in columns 2 and 3. Second,
we identify states with the largest drop in housing prices during the recession, where a
substitution from screening to mimicking should result in worse contract outcomes.25 Even
after controlling for region x origination quarter fixed effects, columns 4 and 5 shows more
delinquencies for post-joining contracts only in large housing price drop states. Additional
results support this interpretation (not tabulated for brevity): we find a reduction in the
average gap between the lender’s contract maturity and rivals’ maturity after joining PayNet,
but this decline is most pronounced for contracts ending up delinquent. And lenders do not
seem to target riskier borrowers after joining. On the contrary, if anything, borrowers’
credit records improve, consistent with the canonical information effect of credit bureaus
(Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2013). Accordingly, we find that the effect is large for existing
borrowers.
Because the set of lenders joining PayNet a few years before the Great Recession instead
of in other periods is small and potentially selected, we take this evidence as suggestive.
Nevertheless, it supports the idea that incentives to match competitors behind contract
design can have a cost if they lead to the neglect of fundamental risk.
4 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of learning about competitors on the behavior of market
participants. This contrasts with the conventional channel of learning about borrowers that
has been emphasized in credit markets. We document contract-level evidence of this effect in
the context of maturity dynamics for SME equipment financing contracts, using micro-data
from the introduction of an information sharing platform. The platform provides details
of previous and current contracts and not simply current payment status or debt balances.
We exploit the staggered timing of lenders joining the platform to estimate the effects of
learning about competitors. We find that, upon joining, lenders adjust their terms toward
what others are offering. Crucially, we address two key confounders: unobserved common
shocks to fundamentals and the endogenous timing of joining the bureau. We also show
that the effect is strongly mediated by market structure and that mimicking competitors
25 Housing crisis states are defined as those with a greater than 30% housing price decline from peak,
according to the FHFA index (14 states).
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can backfire if it leads lenders to neglect fundamental risk.
These results illuminate the interaction between information and market competition
in credit markets. Learning about competitors is likely becoming easier, given the rise of
large pooled databases and improvements in data mining, in credit markets and beyond.
While we find a greater convergence between rivals in our setting, the sign, magnitudes,
and channel can vary in other markets. Indeed, a number of markets are characterized
by a large degree of horizontal differentiation or populations of unsophisticated consumers,
facing endogenously complex products. The implications for consumer welfare, production
efficiency, and policy design are important open questions and further empirical research on
these topics is warranted.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Past Contract Terms in PayNet Credit File
Note: This figure illustrates the type of detailed information contained in a borrower credit file. Contract
terms are highlighted.
Figure 2: Empirical Strategy: Illustration
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Figure 3: Origination of Contracts in PayNet
Note: This figure displays the distribution of contract originations by origination year for our random sample
of PayNet data. The sample includes all contracts in our data.
Figure 4: Contract Maturity by Origination Year
Note: This figure displays the average maturity of the contracts in our regression sample according to origi-
nation year.
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Figure 5: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity by Market Concentration: Dynamic Coef-
ficients Plot
(a) High HHI (b) Low HHI
Note: This figure plots the coefficients from estimating a piecewise version of Equation (1), using event
quarter indicators. For this plot, we extend the Table 4 sample to include contracts originated between the
eight quarters before to eight quarters after the lender joins the bureau. The dashed lines plot 90% level
confidence intervals. The sample is split according to the median HHI of the collateral type-region-contract
size category measured at the contract level. The unit of observation is contract. The dependent variable
is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that
collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts).
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Table 1: Sample Description
No. of borrowers 2,076
No. of lenders 44
No. of relationships 8,194
No. of contracts 54,290
No. of collateral types 23
No. of relationships per lender 94.0
No. of relationships per borrower 2.0
No. of collateral types per lender 6.1
No. of collateral types per borrower 1.7
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the borrowers and lenders in our Table 4 regression sample.
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Table 2: Contract Characteristics
All Contracts Post Joining=1 Post Joining=0
Contract Characteristics N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Loan size (thousands $) 54,290 101 20.3 593 37,333 104 20.7 589 16,957 93 19.7 605
Maturity (months) 54,290 44.3 37 17 37,333 44.5 39 17 16,957 43.8 37 16
Lease (indicator) 54,290 0.81 1 0.39 37,333 0.81 1 0.39 16,957 0.82 1 0.39
Monthly repayment (indicator) 51,568 0.91 1 0.28 35,410 0.90 1 0.29 16,158 0.92 1 0.26
|Maturity gap| (months) 54,290 13.9 11.3 12.8 37,333 14.0 11.4 13.5 16,957 13.5 11.1 11.4
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the terms for the contracts in our Table 4 regression sample. The unit of observation is contract.
36
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3286425
 
Table 3: Lender Entry to PayNet
Lenders Lender size quartile
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2002 2 2
2003 1 1
2004 9 1 1 2 5
2005 2 1 1
2006 2 1 1
2007 4 1 3
2008 4 1 3
2009 3 2 1
2010 0
2011 4 3 1
2012 7 1 2 4
2013 6 5 1
Total 44 11 11 11 11
Note: This table displays the year of joining PayNet for lenders in our Table 4 regression sample according
to the size of the lender. Lender size is measured according to total credit upon joining the bureau.
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Table 4: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Main Specification
Log | gap |
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post Joining -0.069** -0.069** -0.067** -0.059**
[-2.30] [-2.34] [-2.12] [-2.30]
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE No No Yes No
Collateral-Year FE No No No Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
N 54,290 54,290 54,290 54,290
Adj. R-squared 0.521 0.522 0.524 0.524
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating Equation 1. The unit of observation is
contract. The sample includes contracts originated between the four quarters before to four quarters after
the lender joins the bureau. We study only lenders with at least one contract before and one contract after
joining the bureau in the given collateral type. The dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap
between the contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter
(excluding the lender’s own contracts). Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and
the borrower’s risk category. Standard errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 5: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Symmetry
(1) (2)
Log maturity Log |gap|
Post Joining 0.024
[1.16]
Post × Positive Gapt−1 -0.103*
[-1.68]
Post × Negative Gapt−1 -0.055*
[1.91]
Year FE Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 54,290 54,290
Adj. R-squared 0.666 0.522
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating a modified version of Equation 1. The unit
of observation is contract. In column (1), the dependent variable is log contract maturity. In column (2), the
dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau average
maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts). Positive
Gapt−1 and Negative Gapt−1 are defined based on the last contract in the relationship before the lender joins
PayNet. Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk category.
Standard errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 6: Robustness
Bureau average
by collateral
type-quarter-region
Drop crisis
period
Drop small
collateral types
Bureau
average for
previous year
Bureau average
for unrelated
collateral type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post Joining –0.047** -0.078** -0.071** -0.042 0.059
[-1.82] [-2.52] [-2.38] [-1.03] [0.42]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 53,231 51,011 54,136 41,540 22,484
Adj. R-squared 0.510 0.515 0.522 0.553 0.477
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating variations of Equation 1. Column (1) calculates the bureau average within collateral
type-quarter-region, instead of within collateral type-quarter. Column (2) drops observations during the crisis period, defined as 2008 to 2009. Column
(3) drops collateral types with fewer than 100 observations. Column (4) calculates the bureau average from four quarters ago instead of one quarter
ago. Column (5) uses the bureau average for an unrelated collateral type, chosen as the median of the relatedness measure defined by Liberti et al.
(2018). The unit of observation is contract. Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk category. Standard
errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 7: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Split by Market Structure
Log | gap |
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Collateral-Region-
Contract Size HHI
Collateral-
Contract Size HHI
Switching Rate Top 5 Lender
Post Joining × High HHI -0.030 -0.036
[-0.93] [-1.01]
Post Joining × Low HHI -0.116*** -0.104***
[-2.91] [-3.93]
Post Joining × High Switching -0.115***
[-4.28]
Post Joining × Low Switching -0.022
[-0.58]
Post Joining × Top 5 -0.063**
[-2.11]
Post Joining × Not Top 5 -0.101**
[-2.20]
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 53,305 54,101 54,290 54,290
Adj. R-squared 0.523 0.522 0.523 0.523
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating an augmented version of Equation 1 that
considers various market structure measures. In columns 1 and 2, market structure is defined according to
the median HHI of the collateral type-region-contract size category and collateral type-contract size category,
respectively. Column 3 uses the relationship switching rate, defined as the fraction of relationships in the
market last quarter that no longer exist this quarter. Column 4 uses an indicator for whether the lender is
among the five largest in this particular collateral type-region-quarter combination. The unit of observation
is contract. The dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the
bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts).
Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk category. Standard
errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 8: Accounting for Borrower Shocks
Log |gap|
(1) (2)
High HHI Low HHI
Post Joining 0.048 -0.044*
[0.89] [-1.79]
Borrower-Year FE Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 17,615 18,175
Adj. R-squared 0.523 0.561
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating Equation 2. In addition to our Table 4 sample
restrictions, these tests are also limited to borrowers with at least two outstanding relationships. The unit
of observation is contract. The dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract
maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the
lender’s own contracts). Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s
risk category. Standard errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 9: Accounting for Lender Shocks
Panel A: Volume Tests
Log |gap|
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HHI HHI
High Low High Low
Post*Volume -0.002 -0.011* 0.002 -0.008**
[-0.59] [-1.67] [0.38] [-2.09]
Lender-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Year FE No No Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 26,142 27,163 17,607 18,163
Adj. R-squared 0.553 0.574 0.525 0.560
Panel B: Other Lenders’ Entry Tests
Log |gap|
(1)
Post Large Info Shock -0.064***
[-2.88]
Year FE Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes
Controls Yes
N 30,498
Adj. R-squared 0.482
Note: Panel A displays the regression results from estimating Equation 3. Volume is defined as the number of
contracts in the bureau of the same collateral type in the previous quarter. The sample in columns 1-4 is split
according to the median HHI of the collateral type-region-contract size category measured at the contract level.
Panel B displays the regression results from estimating a variant of Equation 1 in which the post dummy is
defined with respect to when the lender experiences a large information shock for its primary collateral type
after it has joined the bureau. In both panels, the unit of observation is contract. The dependent variable
is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that
collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts). Controls include indicators for
contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk category. Standard errors are clustered by lender,
and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 10: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Borrower Heterogeneity
(1) (2)
Log |gap| Log |gap|
Post Joining -0.055** -0.085***
[-2.12] [-2.66]
Post Joining × Single Relationship -0.070
[-1.13]
Post Joining × Past 90+ Days Delinquency 0.036
[1.22]
Collateral-Year FE Yes Yes
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 54,290 54,290
Adj. R-squared 0.545 0.545
Note: This table displays the regression results from estimating Equation 1 by borrower type. The inter-
action in column (1) flags borrowers with one lender at the time of contract origination. The interaction
in column (2) flags borrowers whose worst delinquency in the previous three years exceeds 90 days. The
unit of observation is contract. The dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the con-
tract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in the previous quarter (excluding the
lender’s own contracts). Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s
risk category. Standard errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 11: Joining PayNet and Delinquencies during 2008-2009 Crisis
Number of quarters delinquent in 2008-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All
contracts
High HHI
market
Low HHI
market
Housing
crisis states
Other
states
Post Joining 0.299** -0.430 0.501** 0.594*** 0.113
[2.54] [-1.60] [2.73] [3.41] [0.73]
Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Collateral type-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,236 1,676 1,485 1,324 1,912
adj. R-sq 0.211 0.230 0.246 0.247 0.232
Note: This table shows the effect of joining PayNet on delinquencies during the crisis. The sample is
restricted to (1) lenders joining between 2005 and 2007 and (2) contracts originated no later than 2006
and still open in 2008-2009. The unit of observation is contract. HHI is the credit-weighted Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index for the market, measured in 2001, before the bureau’s inception. Housing crisis states are
defined as those states with a greater than 30% housing price decline from peak, according to the FHFA index
(14 states). Standard errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Online Appendix
Illustrative Theoretical Framework
Assume the following information structure:

sφl
sml

 =

 φ
m−l

+

ǫφl
ǫml


and

 φ
m−l

 ∼ N(0,Σ) and

ǫφl
ǫml

 ∼ N(0,Σe), with Σ and Σe diagonal for simplicity. In this
section, we only solve analytically for the case in which lenders’ adjust their terms toward
what other are offering (i.e., complementarities are strong enough), as this is the canonical
case studied in the literature.
We study a linear equilibrium, in which the signal from the bureau average is linear in φ
and m−l: m¯ = a0 + aφφ+ amm−l + ǫ¯. The rational expectation equilibrium (REE) literature
as shown that, in this simple setting, there exists an equilibrium linear in the lender’s signals,
both before and after joining. In other models, the equilibrium can take different form in
general, but in this section, we focus on the linear case as a first-order approximation. Before
joining the bureau, lender l offers maturity:
m∗l,pre = m0 + β
φ
pres
φ
l + αβ
φ
pres
m
l + ηlf
After joining the bureau, lender l offers maturity:
m∗l,post = m0 + (ρ
φ + αρm)(m¯− a0) + β
φ
posts
φ
l + αβ
m
posts
m
l + ηlf
In a simple REE model, these optimal choice are truly linear, while in other models, they
can take more general forms. Nevertheless, for the sake of illustration, we focus on the linear
case. The weight on the bureau’s signal ρφ + αρm is broken down in two terms to explicitly
reflect that it is informative about both φ and m−l. In a simple REE model, the vectors
of parameters ρ, a, and β are jointly determined and depend on signals’ relative precision.
In other models, other factors enter. For the sake of our argument, it is sufficient to solve
for a in terms of ρ and β. Importantly, it is a common prediction that βpost ≤ βpre across
a wide class of models: lenders put less weight on their signal after joining the bureau (or
equivalently, they collect less information). Although we do not model its micro-foundations,
this prediction is an important ingredient of the argument below.
The argument behind the empirical strategy can be formalized as follows (for the conver-
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gence case): the variance of the gap between the lender’s maturity choice m∗l and the bureau
average m¯ decreases after joining the bureau as long as the information in the bureau is new
and relevant (ρφ + αρm 6= 0).
To show this, we first solve for aφ and am in m¯ by aggregating m
∗
l,post across lenders and
identifying the coefficient on φ and m−l:
aφ = β
φ
post + (ρ
φ + αρm)aφ
am = αβ
m
post + (ρ
φ + αρm)am
⇐⇒
aφ =
β
φ
post
1−(ρφ+αρm)
am =
αβmpost
1−(ρφ+αρm)
Hence m¯ = m0 +
β
φ
post
1−(ρφ+αρm)
φ+
αβmpost
1−(ρφ+αρm)
m−l + ǫ¯. Substituting in m
∗
l,post:
m∗l,post = m0+
β
φ
post
1− (ρφ + αρm)
φ+
αβmpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
m−l+β
φ
postǫ
φ
l +αβ
m
postǫ
m
l +(ρ
φ+αρm)ǫ¯+ηlf
The tracking error between m∗l,post and m¯ after joining the bureau is thus:
dpost = β
φ
postǫ
φ
l + αβ
m
postǫ
m
l − (1− ρ
φ − αρm)ǫ¯+ ηlf
On the other hand, before joining the bureau the tracking error between m∗l,pre and m¯ is:
dpre = β
φ
preǫ
φ
l +αβ
m
preǫ
m
l −ǫ¯+
(
βφpre −
β
φ
post
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)
φ+
(
αβmpre −
αβmpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)
m−l+ηlf
From the last two expressions, it is clear that, as long as the bureau information is infor-
mative, the variance of tracking error d is smaller after joining the bureau. Assuming the
correlation between ǫl and ǫ¯ is negligible:
V [dpost] = β
φ
post
2V [ǫφl ] + α
2βmpost
2V [ǫml ] + (1− ρ
φ − αρm)2V [ǫ¯] + V ar[η]
V [dpre] = β
φ
pre
2V [ǫφl ] + α
2βmpre
2V [ǫml ] + V [ǫ¯] + V [η]
+
(
βφpre −
β
φ
post
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)2
V [φ] +
(
αβmpre −
αβmpost
1− (ρφ + αρm)
)2
V [m−l]
Inspecting term by term reveals that the variance drops after joining the bureau (note that
βpost ≤ βpre). Only in the limit case in which the bureau information is not informative is
V [dpost] = V [dpre], as ρ
φ + αρm = 0 and βpost = βpre.
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Supplemental Analysis
Table A.1: Distribution of collateral types
Collateral type Freq. Percent
Agricultural 3,410 6.28
Airplane 22 0.04
Automobile 595 1.10
Boat 3 0.01
Bus 128 0.24
Construction and Mining 6,049 11.14
Computer 4,538 8.36
Copier 18,737 34.51
Energy 6 0.01
Forklift 1,520 2.80
Logging 90 0.17
Medium Truck 2,547 4.69
Medical 601 1.11
Manufacturing 1,134 2.09
Office 1,217 2.24
Printing 196 0.36
Railroad 33 0.06
Real Estate 152 0.28
Retail 2,437 4.49
Telephone 2,194 4.04
Truck 8,333 15.35
Vending 237 0.44
Waste 111 0.20
Total 54,290 100.00
Note: This table presents the distribution of collateral types for the contracts in our regression sample. The
unit of observation is contract.
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Table A.2: Unexplained Variation in Maturity Choice
Regressors included Root MSE of maturity residual R-squared
Collateral Type FE 17.27 0.04
Collateral Type FE + Year FE 17.25 0.05
Collateral Type FE + Year FE + Lender FE 16.17 0.17
Collateral Type FE + Year FE + Lender FE
+ Borrower FE
13.40 0.52
Collateral Type FE + Year FE
+ Lender-Borrower FE
10.32 0.76
Collateral Type FE + Year FE
+ Lender-Borrower FE + Controls
10.18 0.76
Note: This table displays the root mean squared error of a regression of contract maturity (in months) on a
combination of fixed effects and controls, using our regression sample from Table 4
Table A.3: Pre-Trends
One quarter before joining One year before joining
Loan size ($)
25th percentile 6,289 5,959
Median 20,241 20,000
75th percentile 67,621 68,852
Maturity (months)
25th percentile 36 36
Median 37 37
75th percentile 60 60
Absolute gap (months)
25th percentile 8.94 9.21
Median 12.18 11.59
75th percentile 15.96 15.64
Note: This table displays contract terms prior to the lender joining the bureau, according to when the contracts
were originated.
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Figure A.1: Annual Growth in Bureau Contracts by Collateral Type
Note: This figure displays the annual growth rate of the number of contracts in the bureau for the five main
collateral types: agricultural equipment, construction and mining equipment, computers, copiers, and trucks.
The sample includes all contracts in the data.
Table A.4: Market Power Proxies: Summary Statistics
Market Power Proxy N Mean S.D.
HHI for collateral type-contract size-region 53,305 0.34 0.20
HHI for collateral type-contract size 54,101 0.24 0.11
Top 5 lender indicator 54,290 0.48 0.50
Relationship switching rate 53,857 0.027 0.040
Note: This table summarizes competitive features for observations in our regression sample. The unit of
observation is contract. HHI is the credit-weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the market, measured
in 2001, before the bureau’s inception. Markets are defined as a collateral type-census region-contract size
category or collateral type-contract size category combination. The Top 5 indicator is equal to one if the
lender is among the five largest in this particular collateral type-region-quarter combination. The relationship
switching rate is defined as the fraction of the relationships in the collateral type-region last quarter that end
this quarter.
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Table A.5: Joining PayNet and Contract Maturity: Lender Specialization
Log |gap|
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specialist
definition
Quarters since
1st contract in
collateral type
Quarters since
1st contract in
collateral type-region
Lender’s most
common
collateral type
In lender’s
top 3
collateral types
Collateral type
>30% of lender’s
portfolio
Post x Specialist -0.002 -0.000 -0.045 -0.019 -0.038
[-0.90] [-0.14] [-1.08] [-0.49] [-0.79]
Post -0.050 -0.086 -0.037 -0.062** -0.040
[-0.75] [-1.33] [-0.78] [-2.01] [-0.75]
Specialist 0.017 0.015 0.056 -0.250*** 0.076
[1.19] [1.56] [0.51] [-2.83] [0.52]
Lender-Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 54,290 54,290 54,290 54,290 54,290
adj. R-sq 0.523 0.524 0.523 0.525 0.523
Note: This table displays the regression results from augmenting Equation 1 with different specialist lender variables and their interaction with Post.
All specifications include year and lender-borrower fixed effects as well as contract controls. Columns (1) and (2) define specialization as the number
of quarters since the lender’s first contract originated in this collateral type or collateral type-region category. Columns (3) and (4) define a lender
as a specialist for a specific collateral type if that collateral type is either its most common or one of its three most common in terms of originations.
Column (5) defines a lender as a specialist for a specific collateral type if that collateral type makes up at least 30% of its lending portfolio. The
dependent variable is the log absolute value of the gap between the contract maturity and the bureau average maturity for that collateral type in
the previous quarter (excluding the lender’s own contracts). Controls include indicators for contract size categories, leases, and the borrower’s risk
category. Standard errors are clustered by lender, and t-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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